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'
Volume 42 2020 Issue 2
'
CRIMINAL LAW—DOES A CONFESSION MATTER? A
'




DORON MENASHE* & GUY ALON**
This Article presents a revolution in the rules of confessions and their
admissibility. This article proposes to diverge from the dichotomous test
of admissibility currently applied in the rules of evidence, concerning 
rejecting invalid evidence, in order to recognize the possibility of
applying the blue pencil doctrine in the same manner. According to our
suggestion, courts should partially recognize the admissibility of late
confessions, despite the fact that the source of the late confession is an 
invalid confession previously given. Recently, Israel’s Supreme Court
has determined that a late confession given after an invalid confession is
considered admissible.1 In other words, the court has decided to apply
a relative nullification of improper practices by law-enforcement
authorities and therefore, apply, in a new manner, the blue pencil
doctrine, a doctrine that is usually used in contract law.
This Article is dedicated to the theoretical and practical justifications to 
accept late confessions, emphasizing the rules of evidence as they exist
in statute, as well as the question of incentivization of improper behavior
by law enforcement authorities. The Article addresses the question of
whether it is appropriate to acknowledge the American jurisprudence
* Doron Menashe is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of
Haifa in Israel.
** Guy Alon, L.L.B. (magna cum laude) is a Direct Ph.D. Student in the Faculty of Law 
at the University of Haifa in Israel.
1. CrimC 932/16, State of Israel v. Ben-Uliel (June 19, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). This case will be referred to throughout as the Duma case.
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192 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
principle, known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.2 As this
article will describe below, our proposed solution would be to maintain 
the reliability of a late confession, in contrast to the American doctrine
of fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, this Article would present an 
alternative legal principle which may prove more fitting for this matter, 
in light of the principles of the rules of evidence in the Israeli legal 
system.
INTRODUCTION
The rules of evidence in Israeli jurisprudence, as in its Anglo-
American analogues, are undergoing a paradigm shift.3 Until recently, the
Israeli evidentiary model preferred the “judicial truth” over the “factual 
truth.”4 The Israeli Supreme Court’s preference was prudently enforced.  
The Court applied strict rules of evidence with only a limited scope for 
judicial discretion. However, in a number of important verdicts, the
Court’s tenor has changed to a trend of nullification of the evidentiary
rules. Today, the Israeli evidence law is much closer to the freedom of 
proof model (rather than strict evidence rules),5 as expressed recently by 
the Court.6 The freedom of proof model, does not include harsh formal
2. See e.g. Robert M. Pitler, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Revisited and Shepardized, 
56 CAL. L. REV. 579 (1968).
3. See generally Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 279 
(1996) (broadly discussing the lack of clarity concerning the rules of evidence at the beginning
of this paradigm shift).
4. See, e.g., HCJ 152/82 Elon v. State of Israel PD 36(4) 449 (1982) (Isr.). In this ruling,
Justice Elon wrote, “Every legal system determines the judicial truth according to a system of
norms which are observed and are binding within it.” Id. In other words, the judicial truth is,
in practice, the factual truth supplemented by the filter of the system of norms of the relevant
rules. In any case, it is inconceivable that judicial truth does not dovetail with the system of 
norms which are observed and are binding in that legal system. This is a network of harsh rules
which invalidates evidence lacking relevancy, admissibility, and the like.
5. For a discussion of freedom of proof, see Doron Menashe, Judicial Discretion in Fact-
Finding, Freedom of Proof, and Professionalism of the Courts, in A THEORY OF EVIDENCE
LAW 73 (Guy Sender ed., Perlstien-Genosar Publishers 2017) [Hebrew].
6. Courts have ruled this way consistently, starting in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
See, e.g., CrimA 23/85 State of Israel v. Tubul, PD 42(4) 309 (1988) (Isr.); CrimA 4390/91
State of Israel v. Haj Yihya, PD 47(3) 661 (1993) (Isr.); and CrimA 5614/92 State of Israel v.
Messika, PD 49(2) 669 (1995) (Isr.) (where a mentally ill witness’s testimony was admitted, in
spite of the problem of admissibility inherent in it). This tendency has continued to develop in
recent time. For contemporary rulings, see CrimA 864/12 Katsav v. State of Israel (May 13,
2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); CrimA 7253/14 Finkelstein v. 
State of Israel (Nov. 11, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); and
CrimA 7679/14 Zahada v. State of Israel (Aug. 15, 2016), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). The list grows daily.
 
      
 
       
     
    
          
     
         
     
          
        
     
           
            
     
         




        
         
           
             
           
            
               
            
                
          
                
           
         
         
     
        
          
   
              
      
   
             
       
              
         
                 
   
1932020] DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
rules. And thus, today, the vast majority of evidence is evaluated based
on the weight of the evidence, rather than being evaluated on relevancy or
admissibility, the “classic” rules of evidence.7 
Many discussions in Israeli legal literature, as well as international
legal literature,8 have addressed the inherent difficulties in the freedom of
proof approach.9 The most significant and relevant difficulty for our
purposes is embodied in the approach presented by Menachem Mautner.10 
According to Mautner, the tendency in evidentiary law to prefer freedom
of proof over evidence rules is, in another manner, the preference of
substance over procedure, with an emphasis on the values of the 
approach.11 According to our approach, the tendency to prefer substance
over procedure, as mentioned above, is still correct to this very day. That
preference is expressed all the more so in the circumstances of the Duma
case,12 and in more detail: the more serious the crime is, and the more it
significantly undermines the principles of society, the more flexible the
rules of evidence must be—up to an absolute nullification of the existing 
rules of evidence.13 
7. Behind this normative decision—whether to follow the view which supports
evidentiary rules or the view which supports the freedom of proof—lies a great deal of
theoretical debate. It is important to note that the approach of those who oppose it deals first 
and foremost with the suspicion of a radical development which will bring about too much
discretion in determining facts. See Alex Stein, Hearsay Statements as Evidence in Criminal
Trials: Is and Ought, 21 MISHPATIM 325, 325–351 (1992) [Hebrew]. Similarly, in the Haj
Yihya case, the view is expressed that it is necessary to have evidentiary brakes as formal
obstacles designed to prevent arbitrariness. See CrimA 4390/91, Haj Yihya, PD 47(3) 661.
Beyond what is needed, we will note that unlike the tests of relevancy and admissibility which
are binary, the plane of weight is not binary and is always subject to interpretation. Since this 
interpretation changes from one judge to another, as we have seen in their rulings, no one can
dispute that the judges in Israeli courts use discretion to determine facts. See AHARON BARAK, 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 502 (Papyrus, 1987) [Hebrew] translated in AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL
DISCRETION (Yadin Kaufmann, trans., Yale University Press 1989).
8. See generally, JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS (2012).
9. See e.g., Eliahu Harnon, Time for a Revolution in Evidentiary Law?, 12 MISHPATIM
575, 585–87 (1982) [Hebrew].
10. See Menachem Mautner, The Decline of Formalism and the Rise of Values in Israeli
Law, 17 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 503 (1993) [Hebrew].
11. Id. at 547–49.
12. See CrimC 932/16, State of Israel v. Ben-Uliel (June 19, 2018), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (the Duma case).
13. This is mostly expressed in cases in which there are national security concerns (with
an emphasis on General Security Service interrogations and convictions in military courts, even
though this does not represent the full extent of the applications). See infra Part I (further
discussing this assumption and its basis).
 
      
 
           
  
       
       
               
       
     
       
      
     
     
        
     
           
       
     
     
       
            
         
      
   
               
         
     
    
      
      
     
       
     
             
 
      
            
            
       
            
         
194 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
According to our approach, cases such as Duma merely illustrate the
difficulty which exists on the evidentiary plane and with the courts’
conception of the rules of evidence. This Article proposes using an 
alternative legal rule to moderate judicial leeway, in proposing a suitable
model. Part I of this Article presents the ruling in the Duma case. The
Duma case illustrates the weakness of the Israeli Evidence Law and the
Israeli doctrine of inadmissibility in their attempts to invalidate
confessions made unlawfully. Part II elaborates on the methodical
incentivization of the law enforcement authorities and demonstrates how
the weaknesses of Israeli Evidence Law and of the case law doctrine of
inadmissibility empower law enforcement authorities to create a real 
incentive to confess. Part III deals with a theoretical evidentiary analysis
in light of the court ruling in Duma, considering whether this ruling is 
consistent with the theoretical basis of the rules of evidence. Part IV will
present our proposed model in order to cope with rulings such as Duma.
I. SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN THE DUMA CASE
“[H]istory amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to
save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid
and independent evidence . . . .”14 Recently, the Israeli Supreme Court
ruled in matter concerning a “price-tag” attack carried out in the
Palestinian village of Duma in the West Bank,15 in which three members 
of the Dawabshe family were killed and another child was critically 
injured.16 Due to the severity of the attack, and out of the immediate need
to solve this crime and to prevent any similar attacks, the General Security 
Service (Sherut Bitachon Kelali, known colloquially as the “Shin Bet” or
“Shabak”) used measures which severely violated the fundamental rights
of the defendants before they had confessed. Considering this violation,
the Court ruled that their statements were inadmissible, and therefore the
described confession was disqualified. Nevertheless, in the same breath,
the Court ruled that a subsequent confession by one of the defendants, 
given in different circumstances (and probably not under the same duress),
would be considered admissible, despite the fact that the source of the later
14. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
15. For further review of the meaning of "price-tag" actions, see generally Ori Nir, Price
Tag: West Bank Settlers' Terrorizing of Palestinians to Deter Israeli Government Law
Enforcement, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 277 (2011).
16. See CrimC 932/16, State of Israel v. Ben-Uliel §§ 1–3 (June 19, 2018), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (the Duma case).
 
      
 
      
 
           
     
       
        
       
     
 
       
           
          
     
      
    
       
         
      
     
          
     
    
         
           
          
  
 
       
        
          
           
         
         
 
          
       
               
             
               
           
          
1952020] DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
confession was, as noted, the initial, inadmissible confession that had been 
produced by duress.
The admissibility of late confessions forces us to confront the ancient
question found in the critical determination of the United States Supreme
Court in Haynes v. Washington, which deals with the evidentiary power 
of confession. This Article will raise and answer the question of whether
it is appropriate to allow law enforcement authorities to “extort” (as the
quotation goes) a confession,17 when the authorities could and should be 
required to obtain independent evidence.18 
Setting aside the questions that the ruling raises, this Article will deal
with the specific ruling of the Honorable Court. The Article intends to
discuss whether it is reasonable for the Court to determine factually “that 
the subsequent confessions made, starting from the first documented
interrogation (thirty-six hours after the conclusion of the interrogation of 
necessity), and concluding prior to the second interrogation of necessity,
were of the free will of Defendant 1.”19 
First and foremost, the Authors must note that according to their 
approach, it is inconceivable to rule that confessions made thirty-six hours 
after one harmful interrogation and before another interrogation, may be 
considered “free and voluntary,” and therefore admissible.20 Prior to our
discussion regarding the concrete ruling in the Duma case, this Part will
consider the current case law regarding the admissibility of evidence when 
there is a concern about the degree of freedom and willingness of the 
defendant who is confessing. Similarly, this Part will analyze whether the
ruling in the Duma case is proportional to, or dovetails with, the common 
application of the law.
17. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
18. See generally Boaz Sangero, The Necessity of Corroboration to Confession, 4 ALEI
MISHPAT 245 (2005) [Hebrew] (for the status of the evidence and the destructive potential
embodied in relying on it). Israeli literature has even recognized the concern regarding
incentivizing the investigative authorities to gather additional evidence. See, e.g., Doron
Menashe, Innocent Silence—Critical Analysis of Milstien’s Case, 6 DIN UDVARIM 537, 540–42 
(2012) [Hebrew].
19. CrimC 932/16 State of Israel v. Ben-Uliel (June 19, 2018) Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (The Duma case).
20. In Part II, we deal at length with interrogations of necessity and what occurs in them,
further calling into question the “free and voluntary” nature of the confession. We must note
that an objective interpretation of Section 12 of the Israeli Evidence Law is likely to raise many
questions about the fundamentally “free and voluntary” nature of this confession. See
EVIDENCE ORDINANCE [NEW VERSION] ch. A, art. A, § 12 (1971) [Hebrew].
 
      
 
     
    
        
         
         
        
     
     
     
            
       
       
     
     
     
       
      
    
   
          
    
       
     
        
 
           
           
  
            
       
             
           
             
            
      
              
            
                
  
           
  
       
 
196 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
A.	' General Security Service Interrogations and Limitation of the Scope
of Section 12 of the Israeli Evidence Law
Section 12 of the Israeli Evidence Law sets out the legal rights of a 
suspect to remain silent and to maintain bodily integrity.21 In practical 
terms, Section 12 requires that a confession be made when the suspect has 
the freedom to choose either to confess or not to confess. As time has 
passed, the reasons for invalidating confessions have grown more
numerous. Thus, today, besides the concern of false confessions, the
violation of the defendant’s rights justifies (on its own) the inadmissibility
of the confession.22 Therefore, the use of any means of physical violence,
as occurred in the Duma case, will invalidate the confession. In addition,
even when another invalid tool is used, which prevents the suspect from
exercising the right to remain silent or from taking any course of action 
other than confession, the resultant confession would be invalid. In this 
context, we should note explicitly that even if there are indications that
this confession is in fact reliable, it would remain inadmissible and would
be invalidated nonetheless. Thus, in the Duma case, the suspect
demonstrated familiarity with hidden details at the scene, but his 
confession was nevertheless invalidated by the court.23 
Despite the above-mentioned, and despite the fact that the appropriate
principles are outlined in Section 12 of the Israeli Evidence Law, only a 
very limited number of these principles are applied in practice.24 We must
stress that these principles are most strongly circumscribed in
interrogations conducted by the General Security Service.25 Thus, a
21. See EVIDENCE ORDINANCE [NEW VERSION] ch. A, art. A, § 12 (1971) [Hebrew].
22. See Hagit Lernau, False Confessions and False Convictions, 11 ALEI MISHPAT 351,
358–60 (2014) [Hebrew].
23. See CrimC 932/16 State of Israel v. Ben-Uliel (June 19, 2018), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (the Duma case).
24. In our view, these principles are simply not applied. In other words, confessions made
by defendants which are not free and voluntary, as well as those which impinge on defendants’
rights, are accepted every day by courts throughout Israel, as the tendency of transitioning from
admissibility to weight reorients the question from whether it is proper to convict in the given
circumstances to a debate about the additional evidence required to achieve a conviction, despite 
the difficulties this raises. For such convictions, see CrimA 2869/09 Zinati v. State of Israel
(Nov. 9, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) and CrimA 5956/08
Sliman al ’Uqa v. State of Israel (Nov. 23, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.).
25. See Yotam Berger, Despite Hundreds of Complaints of Shin Bet Torture, HAARETZ
(Dec. 2016), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-never-investigated-cases-
of-alleged-shin-bet-torture-1.5470546. See also Yotam Berger, The Complaints Against
 
      
 
    
     
    
       
   
     
         
        
    
           
     
    
      
        
       
       
         
             
 
     
         
          
          
      
     
 
           
    
               
               
              
         
                
           
       
             
 
            
      
               
            
      
1972020] DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
thorough, in-depth survey of the interrogations in Shabak installations and
their character raises many questions, considering the scope of the
confessions that are deemed admissible in various courts.
The essential legal question of this Article is the status of the
requirement for “free and voluntary” confession in the contemporary 
Israeli courtroom. Examining case law about confessions made after 
General Security Service interrogations leaves us with many concerns. 
Often the courts (the military courts in particular) tend to admit these
confessions despite the inherent difficulties in doing so.26 
Taking all the above into account, the obvious conclusion is that
Section 12, which requires that any confession be free and voluntary, does
not have the ability to prevent the admissibility of confessions which are 
neither free nor voluntary. Due to the limitation the authors have 
mentioned, as expressed by the Duma ruling, the protection offered by
Section 12 is no longer relevant to the circumstances of the matter, and it
cannot help to protect the defendant’s rights from violations.
B. Weakness of the Israeli Inadmissibility Case Law Doctrine
The weakness of Section 12, as noted above, compels us to use an
alternative track to invalidate evidence which should not be admissible 
under these circumstances, of a confession extorted after an
unconstitutional interrogation. The alternative track is found in the case
law doctrine of inadmissibility. This doctrine was first established in the
Yissacharov case.27 The legal basis of this doctrine is accepted in the legal
community as an important and positive development for the rights of
suspects and defendants,28 and is adopted worldwide. Henceforth, and 
General Security Service Interrogators Pile Up, but No Investigations Are Opened, HAARETZ
(July 12, 2016) [Hebrew], https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/premium-1.3145349. This
means that the authorities have been very conservative when it comes to complaints about the
Shabak impinging on the rights of suspects. Thus, complaints of illegal torture in basements
(usually leading to false confessions) do not lead to any investigations of the interrogators. Id.
26. See e.g., CrimC 5338/09 Military Prosecutor v. Abu Alya (Dec. 15, 2011), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (where the defendant was detained in a tiny cell for
a prolonged period of time, was prevented from sleeping, and was subject to other conditions 
of deprivation).  The Court avoided discussing the question of whether the confession was free
and voluntary in these circumstances. The only matter that it touched upon in its ruling was the 
lack of physical violence, and nothing more.  Id.
27. CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor (May 4, 2006), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
28. Id. It is important to recall that the doctrine broadens the “free and voluntary” manner, 
so that now the question is not only about compulsion and violence; thus, improper
psychological and mental forces would justify invalidation. Id.
 
      
 
     
 
       
  
           
    
      
          
         
     
         
    
            
          
   
       
 
                 
             
          
            
     
          
            
           
         
          
               
               
            
            
  
              
            
             
       
          
              
        
            
              
         
                
             
 
198 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
after adopting the inadmissibility doctrine, the Israeli Supreme Court will
have the ability to invalidate evidence based on juridical discretion and 
the need for moral impeccability both for the courts and for law
enforcement authorities.29 
At the same time, analysis of current case law in terms of Shabak
interrogations and the status of confessions today suggests that the case 
law doctrine of inadmissibility does not provide sufficient protection from
the violation of defendant’s rights. 30 Furthermore, this Article goes
further and mentions that, according to the Authors' view, the case law
doctrine of inadmissibility has proven impotent in protecting the rights of
defendants in practice.31 The stated limitation dovetails with the
broadening of the term “free and voluntary” in Section 12 of the Israeli
Evidence Law in all dimensions of the case law, as the police follow in
the Shabak’s footsteps.32 This is also expressed in the interrogation
practices which have become more varied with the passage of time;
harmful confessions are not disqualified, in most cases, by the doctrine.33 
29. We should go back a bit to the tendency that existed in the 1980s, mentioned in the
Introduction: a defined distinction between factual truth and judicial truth. For a broad
discussion of the dilemma between factual truth and judicial truth, and the appropriate outline
with which the court must operate, see DORON MENASHE, THE LOGIC OF ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE, 20–21, 141–43 (2008) [Hebrew].
30. See, generally Boaz Sangero, An Exclusionary Rule for Evidence Obtained Unlawfully
as Established in the Yissacharov Ruling—Good or Bad Tidings?, 19 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV.
67 (2007) [Hebrew] (discussing the disappointment in the outcome of the Yissacharov case).
See also Yuval Merin & Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Miranda, Collins and Yissacharov, The Gap
between the Ideal and the Real in the Yissacharov Ruling, 37 MISHPATIM 429 (2007) [Hebrew].
31. This farfetched argument emerges from the fact that there are no hard and fast criteria
in the doctrine that are inviolable. The doctrine demands no more or less than an analysis of the 
purity of the process in light of the evidence presented. In other words, with sufficient
interpretation, every bit of evidence can be subjected to the case law doctrine of inadmissibility, 
as we will illustrate below.
32. It is worth noting that this tendency, in which the civilian law enforcement agencies
adopt a practice originating with military law enforcement agencies, is not new. Thus, for
example, the rules of search and seizure followed by the police have been extensively influenced
by the rules of search and seizure followed by the military police. See Asaf Harduf, When You
Say Yes, What Do You Mean? Concerning Intimate Technology, Autonomy of the Suspect and 
Legal Opportunism: Searching a Mobile Phone with the ‘Consent’ of a Suspect—In Light of the
Pelach and Kors Rulings, 224 HASANEGOR 4, 5 (2015) [Hebrew].
33. As an aside, a significant number of the most important rulings of the Court about 
invalidating confessions have been issued in cases in which this invalidation has had no practical 
consequence. The Yissacharov case was adjudicated after the defendant had been discharged
from the military, and he was not even present for the verdict. CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v.
Chief Military Prosecutor (May 4, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
 
      
 
        
         
      
      
            
     
        
   
    
        
     
       
       
 
               
            
            
               
            
                  
               
           
             
             
          
               
           
            
    
          
           
            
              
            
             
             
             
       
                
        
                
               
          
 
1992020] DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
To the Authors' great dismay, the courts tend to admit confessions
that were extracted through interrogation practices which impinge on the
defendants in an almost sweeping manner.34 The courts have avoided 
acting as a system overseeing and restraining law enforcement
authorities.35 The discussion of the weakness of the case law doctrine of
inadmissibility reaches its conclusion (chronologically and ideologically) 
in Meiraz, in which the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling reaffirmed the
conviction of a senior public servant based on a confession extracted 
through interrogation practices that included continuous threats of harm.36 
In addition, a thorough survey of the case law doctrine of 
inadmissibility, which in its first days was a significant development,
demonstrates that it is effectively impotent when it comes to protecting 
defendants’ rights. In other words, Israeli jurisprudence has no inviolable 
(Isr.). The most significant invalidation of a confession due to improper conduct by law
enforcement authorities has been in a case in which the appellants were the heirs of the
defendant; from an operative point of view, the invalidation of the confession was therefore not
particularly significant. See CrimA 1301/06 Estate of Yoni Elzam v. State of Israel, PD 63(2)
177 (2009) (Isr.). Beyond this, we must note that even in this exceptional case, the confession 
was thrown out due to the right to counsel not being honored; thus, the defendant did not receive
full vindication. See CrimA 9956/05, Shai v. State of Israel PD 63(2) 742 (2009) (Isr.) (finding 
the defendant cleared of manslaughter charges but guilty of negligent homicide). On the other
hand, the Court finds fit to acquit defendants due to the misbehavior of law enforcement
authorities, which emerges more from the lack of weight being given to incriminating evidence
and less from a desire to protect the defendants from improper practices. See CrimC 1051/03
State of Israel v. Zohar (Nov. 15, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, In Hebrew)
(Isr.). We must note that the Yissacharov case has never been mentioned or discussed in terms 
of the rights of the defendants from the standpoint of harsh interrogation tactics and the
confessions produced by such means.
34. The authors should note that deceptive interrogation practices have two determined
limitations: (i) the deception cannot be of a type which violates the suspect’s right against self-
incrimination; and (ii) the deception cannot be one which impinges on the cause of justice.
These two limitations must be analyzed, taking into consideration the circumstances of a given
case. According to our approach, the limitations of case law on interrogation practices, much
like the case law doctrine of inadmissibility, are quite weak and incapable of providing sufficient
protection for defendants. Let us refer to the most significant case in this area, which constitutes
the basis for contemporary case law, in which the Supreme Court declined to vacate a conviction 
based on evidence obtained by a police officer who had disguised himself as a clergyman 
(specifically, a rabbi). See CrimA 9808/06 Yaron Sankar v. State of Israel (July 29, 2010),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
35. As we illustrate the current tendency in case law, we must refer to the reductio ad
absurdum of the recent Supreme Court ruling, CrimA 4109/15, Lior Meiraz v. State of Israel
(July 9, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
36. Id.
 
      
 
     
  
     
    
  
    
       
       
      
  
             
           
   
     
 
    
       
      
    
      
       
       
     
     
      
 
             
                 
          
 
              
            
 
             
    
 
200 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
element, as the discussion in its entirety is subject to the specific judge’s 
discretion and interpretation.37 
II. EXISTING LAW: EVIDENTIARY INCENTIVES FOR FALSE
$
CONFESSIONS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
$
Setting aside the question regarding the status of the described 
confession and the justifications for the court’s interpretation of it, it is 
relevant to deal, in a deeper manner, with the term “interrogation of 
necessity.”38 This necessity interrogation, and the confession given
following it, would demonstrate for us the entire criminal process, based
on this case study.
The “interrogation of necessity” is a term that was born in the Israeli
General Security Service. Defining an interrogation as one of necessity is
allowed in a ticking time bomb scenario, one constituting a substantial
concern of harm to national security and creating an immediate need for
information to foil an imminent act of terror.39 
In the framework of this interrogation, it is possible, under certain 
circumstances, to withhold the right to counsel, without such an act 
invalidating the products of the investigation. The current approach is that 
an interrogation of necessity and its conditions constitute a proper balance 
between the rights of the suspect and the unique needs of this
interrogation.40 Unlike standard interrogations, which require honoring 
the right to counsel and guaranteeing more appropriate conditions for the
defendant, interrogations of necessity constitute a sufficient reason for the 
courts to allow questioning under shameful conditions, which often are so 
indefensible as to give rise to arguments against the admissibility of any 
37. It is worth noting that there is a certain potential harm for the innocent, as most of
those weak suspects who would give a false confession are the same ones who would be weak
defendants and not fully explore their rights to appeal, due to emotional or economic
considerations.
38. For further review, see Paola Gaeta, May Necessity Be Available as a Defence for
Torture in the Interrogation of Suspected Terrorists?, 2 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 785, 787–792 
(2004).
39. See CrimA 1776/06 al-Sayed v. State of Israel (2011), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
40. Id.
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evidence obtained under them.41 In most, if not all, cases, the Court has
rejected these arguments.42 
The above descriptions lead us to the following hypothesis: due to the
fact that case law inclines to admit borderline confessions (except under 
the most unusual of circumstances),43 and due to the fact that no 
evidentiary sanction is placed upon law enforcement authorities, the
authors find ourselves in a situation in which there is a false incentive for 
defendants to make a false confession, and there is an incentive for law
enforcement authorities to extract false confessions.  
We will base our argument on the Duma case. In the Duma case, the 
defendant gave multiple confessions, while only the first few confessions
were made due to invalid means. In the Duma case, the Israeli Supreme
Court ruled that the invalidation of an earlier confession does not
necessarily imply that a later confession would be invalidated as well.44 
In fact, the Court has ruled that the fate of the later confessions should be 
determined by whether the impression left by the improper means on the 
suspect is still in force, leaving the suspect no other viable alternative to
confession.45 
This means that when considering the admissibility of a confession,
the court must ask: what is the status of late confessions in light of the
invalid means used against the suspect when the initial confessions were
made? Hence, as the effect of the invalid means fades, and the suspect
decides of his or her own free will to continue to confess, those later 
41. See, e.g., CrimC 31351-12-14 State of Israel v. Gabbay (2015), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). It is important to note that despite the factual determination
that the interrogators’ testimonies should be given precedence, the authors may perceive a very
blasé attitude towards violence on the part of the honored judge, as according to him, “Not every 
use of force is to be considered violence.” Id. Regarding sleep deprivation and the mental stress
of being placed in harsh circumstances, the judge determined that “the fact that the defendant
found it difficult to sleep while in his cell due to the conditions of that location, bright lights and
noise . . . [did] not constitute, on its own, the deprivation of sleep which would be an invalid
technique likely to bring about a confession which is not free and voluntary.” Id.
42. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court determined that as long as the interrogation
techniques did not break his spirit or confuse his senses, his confession is “free and voluntary,”
as Section 12 dictates. See CrimA 7090/15 Khalifa v. State of Israel (2016), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
43. The authors must note that in extreme cases, the evidence is attributed less weight due
to the scandalous behavior, even though it is almost never invalidated when such invalidation
would lead to the defendant’s release.
44. See CrimC 932/16, State of Israel v. Ben-Uliel §§ 32–34 (June 19, 2018), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (the Duma case).
45. Id.
 
      
 
     
   
      
        
   
         
        
      
       
      
          
        
        
    
    
        
            
 
        
     
          
      
 
               
        
          
 
        
               
  
               
                  
 
            
          
              
         
           
     
             
 
              
          
  
202 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
confessions will prove admissible for all purposes, setting aside the 
interrogation’s flaws.46 Indeed, it appears that this procedure applies 
consistently to the crux of this issue—protecting the suspect’s freedom to 
remain silent and to maintain bodily integrity, as well as exposing the truth
and preventing false acquittals.
This Article asks whether it is conceivable that after the first invalid 
confession, the effects of the invalid means fade, yet the suspect 
voluntarily continues to confess because he or she assumes that the initial
confessions will be admissible at trial. This is not an unreasonable
scenario, in light of the nullification of the rules of evidence in Israeli 
jurisprudence.47 This scenario also emphasizes the tendency in case law 
that dogmatically pursues admissibility in a broad and expansive manner.
Today, in practice, the Israeli courts hardly ever dismiss a confession 
given by the defendant,48 and the suspect may very well assume (and his
attorney would often state explicitly), that a given confession is always
taken into account, no matter the circumstances.49 Beyond those
mentioned above, there are additional reasons for the suspect to make a
late confession.  
One such reason is that confession before the police usually improves 
the conditions for the suspect significantly, in both the pre-trial 
proceedings and at trial itself.50 In addition, the suspect is likely to be
concerned that even if the later confessions will be made without resorting 
46. The authors should mention that these principles are not always applied in case law.
See, e.g., CrimC 1051/03, State of Israel v. Zohar (Nov. 15, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, In Hebrew) (Isr.). There, the interrogation of a foreign worker, Valentine Tokila, 
led to conviction that was not immediately invalidated.
47. See 1 GABRIEL HALLEVY, THEORY OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 178–81 (2013).
48. The authors believe that the best example given is the Duma case. See case cited supra
note 1.
49. Let us go further and note that many times these issues arise in Shabak interrogations,
where the suspect is not afforded the right to counsel, as in fact occurred in the Duma case at
issue here.
50. Turning “state’s witness” is the classic legal model for incriminating testimony offered
as part of plea bargain with the prosecution, as laid out in Israeli Evidence Law:
A court shall not convict an accused person on the strength of the single testimony
of an accomplice unless it finds something supporting it in the evidence; however,
where the accomplice is a state’s witness, his testimony shall require
corroboration; for this purpose, “state’s witness” means an accomplice who
testifies on behalf of the prosecution after a benefit has been given or promised
him.
EVIDENCE ORDINANCE [NEW VERSION] ch. A, art. A, § 54 (1971) (Isr.). However, this is
insufficient, as defendants receive benefits in exchange for their confessions. Thus, we must 
stop implementing this rule and abusing defendants.
 
      
 
           
       
   
        
             
          
        
     
    
     
       
     
       
   
      
      
      
        
       
         
     
     
     
    
            
      
      
       
           
       
     
      
       
        
    
         
 
             
          
         
2032020] DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
to any invalid means, the police will in any case engage in further invalid
and illegal interrogation practices, either to elicit additional confessions or
in order to obtain other evidence, whether true or false.
One may describe this situation as “Situation A”: Utilitarian False
Confession. In this framework, the incentive for the defendant is to make
a false confession.51 Situation A is one situation in which a confession is 
made due to invalid means and the suspect understands (either practically
or after consultation with counsel) that only in the most extreme 
circumstances are confessions thrown out, even if they have been 
extracted in an invalid manner. Facing such a reality, the suspect has no 
reason, after having already given at least one false confession, to refrain
from doing so again, as this will improve his or her conditions and prevent 
the application of invalid duress and other measures which had previously
been used when he or she did not initially confess.
However, even if there is still an incentive not to give an additional
false confession (e.g., for reasons of conscience), it may still be that the
practical, immediate considerations will overwhelm, in most cases, those 
conscientious reasons. This is Situation A, in which the false confession
is utilitarian and wholly advantageous. There is nothing to lose, as the 
defendant has already made a confession, which will in all likelihood be
deemed admissible, in the defendant’s estimation.
Counterarguments to the article's claim, as mentioned above, would
be based on the claim that we cannot definitely state that the defendant
has been in Situation A—that is, that the defendant really did assume that
the court would deem his or her false confession admissible. Since one
cannot know if the defendant was indeed in such a predicament, one 
cannot determine if Situation A, Utilitarian False Confession, applies.
Indeed, this claim presents quite a challenge. In fact, the article's claim
may very well be dealing with a mixed bag: a group of defendants, some 
of whom are guilty and some of whom are not, some of whom have 
assumed that their earlier confessions would be admissible, and some who 
have assumed that there is a certain chance of their earlier confessions
being thrown out. In terms of this group, it is difficult (at least, more
difficult) to claim that there is no difference between the possibility that 
an innocent person will confess again and the possibility that a guilty 
person will confess again. Nevertheless, this issue raises at least a 
51. For a broad discussion of the incentives for suspects and defendants to volunteer
evidence, see Doron Menashe & Limor Riza, Probative Incentive for Inducing Cooperation
Between Suspects and the Prosecution, 25(3) MECHKEREI MISHPAT 845 (2010) [Hebrew].
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reasonable doubt about the incentive for confession. This calls for an in-
depth analysis of the matter in order to obviate any reasonable doubt.
Consider another situation, beyond Situation A. The law
enforcement authorities, aware of the course of events described above,
intentionally take this method, that is, carry out improper investigations 
and subsequently conduct lawful investigations. The authors will call this
“Situation B”: Scheme to Extract a Utilitarian False Confession (from the
viewpoint of game theory).52 This scenario is defined by a chain of events
in which the maximal utility for the defendant would be achieved by false
confession, and thus the dominant strategy for the defendant (in 
accordance with our game theory) would be to give a false confession.53 
Afterwards, as in the Duma case, we may conduct an additional
interrogation, this time lawfully, and extract the same confession.
III. QUESTIONS REGARDING THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR ADMITTING 
A LATE CONFESSION—RELEVANCE
Setting aside the court’s rulings from the positivist viewpoint and the 
pragmatic ramifications of accepting late confessions, this article aims to 
address a question which, for some unknown reason, has vanished from
the court’s rulings, an inviolable condition for evidence to be considered
admissible. Our question touches on the following: is the admission of the 
later confessions, given the fact that the earlier confessions are null and
void, relevant to the circumstances of the matter? This question has yet
to be addressed in legal literature, and it investigates the relation between
the late confession and the requirements of relevancy in the Israeli 
evidence law; namely, whether it is admissible and has to do with the 
issues at hand. 
A. Situation A: The Utilitarian False Confession
As we apply the theoretical basis to the circumstances of the case, this
Article will analyze the stated situations from a legal point of view. Let 
us begin with Situation A, in which the suspect who has already given a 
false confession has an incentive to make another false confession. In this 
52. See MAYA BAR-HILLEL & URIEL PROCACCIA, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW
108–11 (2012) (providing an economic analysis of the dilemma, as well as its final resolution).
53. Id. at 110–11. Finally, let us note yet another possibility for the second confession:
the sunk cost fallacy. Here, the defendant may view the initial confession as a sunk cost, 
irretrievable, and thus choose to follow the same course of action. In this sense, the unlawful 
extraction of a confession creates an incentive (i.e., a behavioral inclination) for the defendant
to cling to his or her false confession.  Id.
 
      
 
        
      
        
    
   
         
      
     
   
       
    
      
   
     
      
              
    
     
    
     
       
       
    
      
     
      
         
   
          
     
 
          
 
            
          
    
            
          
                 
               
         
2052020] DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
situation, the causal link between the illegal act and the extraction of the
confession is severed. In that point, the suspect understands that there is 
no reason in avoiding giving an additional confession, and therefore he
has no true choice with regard to substantial ramifications or utility. This 
situation cannot invalidate the confession based on Section 12 of the 
Israeli Evidence Law.54 Nevertheless, though this argument has not yet
been expressed in case law or legal literature, we may still argue for the
inadmissibility of this confession in certain circumstances (henceforth, the
“conditions of inadmissibility”).
This Article maintains that despite the later confession (setting aside
the motivations for that later confession), this confession is not admissible.
To the authors' dismay, the Court and prevailing legal discussion in 
general has ignored an additional threshold criterion mandated by the 
Israeli Evidence Law—the requirement of relevancy.55 The requirement
of relevancy is often forgotten in the legal discussion of confessions.
Evidence is admissible if, and only if, it is relevant and not excluded by
another provision of the Israeli Evidence Law.
Nevertheless, when this article is talking about confessions, it appears 
that their relevancy—their evidentiary power—always applies. In other 
words, a confession on its own brings about the presumption by both sides
of the proceeding, and by the court itself, that the confession is relevant to
the circumstances of the matter. The sole question is whether the
confession can be invalidated despite its relevancy. The central
justification for this is the common denominator which exists in every
legal confession—namely, an act which is decidedly against one’s own 
interest. Case law reveals that “an innocent person does not incriminate
himself or herself,” which is the inverse of the Talmudic rule, “One does 
not incriminate oneself.”56 
At the same time, and despite the problematic status of the 
defendant’s confession, the rationales employed by the Court are not valid 
54. Israeli Evidence Ordinance [New Version], No Legal Frontiers (1971),
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/israeli-domestic-legislation/evidence/evidence019ed2.html? 
lang=en.
55. See EVIDENCE ORDINANCE [NEW VERSION] ch. A, art. A, § 1 (1971) (Isr.) (“Subject
to the provisions of this Ordinance, any person may be summoned to give evidence which is
admissible and relevant to the case.”).
56. The authors must emphasize that this Talmudic principle means that one cannot
incriminate oneself (i.e., that a confession is utterly inadmissible in criminal law). However,
Israeli case law has taken the opposite position, that a confession is presumed to be admissible.
For a full analysis of this, see Boaz Sangero & Mordecai Halpert, Nevertheless, Reversing the
View of a Confession, 27 MECHKEREI MISHPAT 529, 531–33 (2011) [Hebrew].
 
      
 
        
      
       
             
    
      
    
     
            
   
   
 
     
       
       
        
   
      
     
       
   
 
            
       
       
      
           
       
 
               
            
               
          
           
 
              
             
           
     
           
  
206 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
in the circumstance of Utilitarian False Confession, as presented.57 In
Situation A, the suspect acts out of self-interest (or, at least, what the
suspect identifies as self-interest). Due to this, such a confession (as long
as it does not have any other indicator of reliability, nor does it seem that
further legal proceedings will yield any such indicators) is simply
inadmissible, as it does not have any relevancy or probative value. An
example of this is an extremely laconic confession or a confession based 
on perishable details from the scene, or those which can be neither proven 
nor disproven. This article will deal with this from a Bayesian viewpoint
in Section III.C.58 
B.	' Situation B: Police Scheme to Extract a Utilitarian False 
Confession
In Situation B, as long as the above conditions of inadmissibility
apply, the confession must in any case be irrelevant. The authors’ claims
to the confession's lack of relevance due to the fact that the confession of 
the suspect, given under these circumstances, does not raise or lower the 
probability that he did commit the offense.
In addition, such scheme and its attendant actions fulfill the 
requirement for a causal link between improper means and the making of
a confession. If so, without any connection to its irrelevancy, the 
confession would be subject to disqualification by Section 12 of the Israeli
Evidence Law.59 
We must note that even if the above conditions do not apply (for 
example, even if there is an element of reliability of the confession), and
even if it concludes hidden details from a particularly strong type, the
confession is still disqualified according to the abovementioned Section
12, which as stated does not adopt a test of reliability.60 Does the test of 
reliability allow for a blue pencil doctrine, that is, recognize the
57. See, e.g., Criminal Further Hearing 4342/97, State of Israel v. El Abid, 51(1) PD 736
(1997) (Isr.) (“The wisdom of the heart dictates to us that no person would incriminate himself
or herself when he or she is innocent.”) (Cheshin, J.). This is an absolute reversal of Jewish 
law, assuming that there is no reason for self-incrimination by the innocent; therefore, any
confession must have substantive weight (in contrast to Jewish law, where any confession by
the defendant is disqualified).
58. For an example of the application of Bayes’ Theorem from the viewpoint of the two-
world model, see Doron Menashe & Eyal Gruner, Hypotheses of Innocence, the Proper Test:
Should They Be Admitted, Rejected or Ascribed Less Weight if the Defendant Fails to Raise
Them? 11 DIN UDVARIM 273, 304–09 (2018) [Hebrew].
59. See EVIDENCE ORDINANCE [NEW VERSION] ch. A, art. A, § 12 (1971) (Isr.).
60. See id.
 
      
 
   
           
      
         
         
          
 
       
       
     
          
        
       
    
      
       
        
    
      
        
       
     
     
   
 
 
             
       
          
               
            
         
 
            
            
    
            
               
          
         
       
2072020]	( DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
admissibility of confessions even though they have been given subsequent
to invalid confessions? In other words, and in a similar way to the blue
pencil doctrine's application in the contract law field,61 this article intends 
to claim that a relative nullity is possible, even in the manner of unlawfully
extorted confessions. This article will address that inquiry in Part IV.
C.	' Bayesian Analysis of Late Confessions Based on the Two-World
Model
According to Bayes’ Theorem,62 in order to determine whether 
evidence is relevant to the circumstances of the matter, the one must
determine if the given event’s occurrence increases (or decreases) the
likelihood of an event’s occurring.63 Bayes’ Theorem is significant, as it
analyzes the probability of guilt after the addition of new information (i.e.,
additional evidence or confession). For this article's inquiry, it must ask
two additional questions.
First, does the defendant’s confession under shameful conditions and 
torture increase, on its own, the probability that a crime has been
committed? This Article maintains that a confession made under the
stated circumstances neither increases nor decreases the probability of
guilt, as a consequence of the shameful conditions to which the suspect
has been subjected.64 In other words, the probability of a confession after
interrogation by the General Security Service is not influenced by
innocence or guilt, nor does it influence the probability of innocence or 
guilt. Based on the Bayesian model for admissibility and Section 1 of the 
Israeli Evidence Law,65 we are talking about a confession that is 
irrelevant—and therefore inadmissible.
61. See, e.g., Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for
Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672 (2008).
62. Thomas Bayes et al., An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of
Chances, 53 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 370 (1763). We must note that despite this essay’s age, it is
still valid and applicable today. See, e.g., BRADLEY P. CARLIN & THOMAS A. LOUIS, BAYES
AND EMPIRICAL BAYES METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS (Chapman and Hall/CRC eds., 3rd ed.
2010).
63. For an in-depth analysis of the theorem, as expressed in Israeli legal literature, see Ron
A. Shapira, The Probabilistic Model of the Law on Evidence—Part One: Traditional Criticism, 
19 IYUNEI MISHPAT 205, 206–08 (1995) [Hebrew].
64. These shameful conditions in their own right apparently justify the disqualification of
the confession by law. At the same time, as we have seen above, case law often reserves the
rule of disqualification of confessions which are not free and voluntary for exceptional
circumstances; it even broadens the rubric of “free and voluntary,” as we noted in Section I.A.
65. See EVIDENCE ORDINANCE [NEW VERSION] ch. A, art. A, § 1 (1971) (Isr.).
 
      
 
      
     
       
        
       
 
        
 
    
          
         
 
       
            
        
          
 
     
 
            
      
   
 
             
         
           
              
           
          
         
      
    
             
              
         
   




208 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
Second, we come to the question at the heart of this Article: does an
additional confession, made under reasonable conditions and no torture,
increase the probability that the one offering this confession has in fact
committed a crime? This Article maintains, in opposition to the Duma
case, that even such a confession is irrelevant under these circumstances.66 
In order to illustrate the analysis, we present the following formula.67 
1.	! G signifies the eventuality of guilt, while Not-G signifies lack of 
guilt.
2.	! C signifies the Confession.
3.	! P(a) is the standard indication of the function of the probability
of each event. Thus, P(c) is the probability that the defendant will 
confess.
4.	! P(B/A) is the standard indication of conditional probability of 
event B assuming that event A occurs or has occurred. For our
purposes, P(C/G) is the probability that a confession will be
made, assuming that the defendant is indeed guilty of having
committed the crime.
5.	! O(A) refers to the odds of event A.68 
𝑃(𝐸⁄𝐺)
O(𝐺⁄𝐸) = O(𝐺) × 𝑃(𝐸⁄𝑛𝑜𝑡 − 𝐺) 
According to the theorem, the odds of the defendant’s guilt, given the
existence of certain evidence—O(G/E), the a posteriori odds of guilt— 
are influenced by a number of factors.
66. It should be noted that we are talking about the subjective facet of Bayes’ Theorem
(i.e., the calculation of Bayes’ Theorem is based on subjective considerations). The analysis is
based on specific knowledge that the defendant has in reaching a decision. The simple man on 
the street who is asked whether he will confess to a crime he has not committed cannot be
compared to a defendant who is sitting in a jail cell. The difference in subjective a priori
probabilities justifies a different Bayesian analysis. For more on the subjective Bayesian 
analysis, see J. Pfanzagl, Subjective Probability Derived from the Morgenstern-von Neumann 
Utility Concept, in ESSAYS IN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 237–51 (Martin Shubik ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1967).
67. For the Bayesian analysis which inspired this, see Doron Menashe & Shai Otzari,
What is the Weight of a Confession? Re-Evaluating the Bayesian Weight of Criminal
Confession, in A THEORY OF EVIDENCE LAW 386, 392–94 (Guy Sender ed., Perlstien-Genosar
Publishers 2017) [Hebrew].
68. The term “odds” refers to the probability of an event divided by the total probability




      
 
             
    
        
	  
        
  
   
      
 
	  
             
        
       
     
 
           
        
      
         
       
  
       
       
      
       
           
     
          
        
     
 
               
          
           
                
            
             
 
2092020] DOES A CONFESSION MATTER?
First of all, there is O(G): the a priori odds of guilt, or the odds of the
defendant’s being guilty before considering the weight of any additional
evidence. This is the formula for the odds of guilt:
𝑃(𝐺)
O(𝐺) = 𝑃(𝑛𝑜𝑡 − 𝐺) 
Second, there is the ratio of the evidence’s feasibility (i.e., the ratio
between the probability that such evidence would exist among guilty 
persons and the probability that such evidence would exist among 
innocent persons). The formula for the feasibility of evidence is as 
follows: 
𝑃(𝐸⁄𝐺)
O(𝐺/𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐺) = 𝑃(𝐸⁄𝑛𝑜𝑡 − 𝐺) 
Thus, in order to determine the odds of the defendant’s guilt in light
of all of the evidence uncovered, the fact-finder must determine the e odds
of guilt and analyze the ratio of the feasibility of the evidence. Afterwards, 
the fact-finder can determine the facts using Bayes’ Theorem, updating 
the odds of guilt.
Now, let us demonstrate how this applies to the circumstances of the
Duma case. Let us assume that we are looking to prove that X committed 
a price-tag attack. For the purpose of disposition, there is a one-in-four 
chance that X has in fact committed the crime (a priori odds of guilt).
Therefore, the a priori odds of guilt in these circumstances would be 
twenty-five percent.69 
Second, let us assume that a confession makes it ten times more likely 
(the ratio of the feasibility of evidence) that a person is guilty. At this 
stage, after the law enforcement authorities have squeezed a confession
out of the defendant, creating evidence ex nihilo, we may use Bayes’ 
Theorem to update the odds of the defendant’s guilt. However, as we 
illustrated above, using improper means such as torture does not increase
the probability after a confession has been made, so the a priori odds of
guilt remain as they were. Correspondingly, according to the game-theory
approach we presented above, late confessions as well do not increase the 
69. We are talking about a disposition for illustrative purposes, but it is not farfetched to
argue that there is an evidentiary value to detainment by law enforcement agencies (not merely
because law enforcement agencies decide to invest resources in detaining this specific person).
Richard Posner was one of the first to consider the resources of the prosecution as having
practical ramifications, in terms of everything related to laws of evidence and odds of guilt. See
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477,
1505–09 (1998).
 
      
 
         
      
       
       
       
           
       
             
      
   
         
   
        
        
        
        
         
   
      
    
    
   
 
     
        
          
        
      
 
             
               
 
                
            
          
         
           
               
          
       
       
210 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:191
measure of probability a priori. Thus, we have proven that each of these
confessions neither increases nor decreases the probability of guilt, and 
thus these confessions have no pragmatic relevancy. To put it more
cautiously, we may say that at least the weight of relevancy of the 
confession is significantly less than the weight ascribed to them today.
The authors note, from a practical point of view, that this research 
recognizes the pragmatic difficulty in using Bayes’ Theorem. The authors 
intend to use the theorem with an emphasis on the pragmatic difficulty in
a judicial determination that there are no ramifications for the defendant,70 
and an emphasis on the difficulty of applying probabilistic theories in 
law.71 Indeed, the probative value of any item of evidence is influenced
by the whole of the body of evidence and their reciprocal relationship
which cannot be expressed in probabilistic calculations. Even if it were 
to be expressed, such a complex mathematical equation is impractical.72 
In light of these considerations, in order to carry out a Bayesian analysis 
in a certain legal proceeding, it is necessary to simplify significantly the
situation under discussion in such a way that has an effect upon the 
validity of the analysis’s conclusions.73 
In Section III.D, we will present the difficulties inherent in using 
evidentiary additions for the purpose of proving guilt beyond any 
reasonable doubt; and in Part IV, we will present a practical proposal for 
a solution, which will balance the desire to avoid convicting innocents and 
the need of the law enforcement authorities to fight crime.
D.	' The Difficulties Inherent in Using Evidentiary Additions for the 
Purpose of Proving Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The rulings presented above, both in military and civilian court,
illustrate for us the difficulty and the existing impingements on the rights 
of defendants. The discussion on the plane of weight, apart from the
70. We must note that such a determination defies the tendency of Israeli jurisprudence,
which discusses the corpus of evidence on the plane of weight, not the plane of admissibility,
ignoring the question of whether the model is appropriate or not.
71. We must note that this research’s departure point is that there is no hidden detail in
the original confession (aside from conceding one’s guilt based on the information put in the
defendant’s mouth) and, in addition, that the second confession relies, in its entirety, on the
original, essentially being a laconic repetition of the first confession. For the difficulties 
inherent in relying on recreations constructed based on confessions extracted via invalid means, 
see Retrial 3032/99, Barens v. State of Israel 56(3) PD 354, §§ 5–6 (2002) (Isr.) (Dorner, J.).
72. See Michael S. Pardo, Juridical Proof, Evidence, and Pragmatic Meaning: Toward
Evidentiary Holism, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 400–03 (2000).
73. See Menashe & Otzari, supra note 67, at 392–94.
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difficulty of incentivization inherent in it, contains within it a leeway that 
is inappropriate in the criminal sphere, which is also expressed in a broad
construction.74 
According to our approach, and as we showed above, it cannot be that
after proving that there is no relevance to such confessions, and as arises 
from the inherent difficulties in avoiding invalidating them via the case
law doctrine of inadmissibility, the courts will nevertheless pass over 
these two insurmountable hurdles and evaluate on the plane of the weight
of the evidence.
In this context, these inherent difficulties are reinforced by the
tendency of law enforcement authorities to collect only incriminating
evidence and to avoid exculpatory evidence.75 Thus, the Court avoids
being exposed to the general network of evidence, including facts which 
constitute a type of “negative supplementary evidence” (our definition).
Negative supplementary evidence is any factual detail that may provide
an explanation that is not consistent with the prosecution’s narrative for 
how the event unfolded. Such a supplement is particularly likely to
provide a reasonable explanation for the defendant’s version. Thus, in 
light of the fact that it cannot help the prosecution’s case, sufficient 
resources (or any resources at all) are not invested to investigate factual
alternatives. This behavior of the prosecution, in certain circumstances,
is likely to be the difference between acquittal and conviction of an
innocent person.
The Authors will not delve into the depths of these matters in this
constricted framework, but it is still worthwhile to note that the question
74. For the difficulty inherent in a broad construction, see Boaz Sangero, Broad
Construction in Criminal Law?! On the Supreme Court Chief Justice as a Super Legislator and 
Eulogizing the Strict Construction Rule, 3 ALEI MISHPAT 165 (2003) [Hebrew]. See also
Gabriel Hallevy, The Legal and Constitutional Principle in Israeli Punitive Law, 8 KIRYAT
HAMISHPAT 335 (2009) [Hebrew].
75. This inclination, whether intentional or not, is without a doubt a situation of perversion
of justice on the part of the prosecution. Broad construction of this statement allows us to say 
that this is akin to falsification of evidence on the part of the prosecution, which is likely to lead
to false convictions, while case law and rulings have not addressed this problem at all. For an
exception to this tendency, see CrimC 44591-11-10 Department for Internal Investigations v.
Alchades (Apr. 12, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Although
in this case as well, the court ultimately vindicated the defendant.  Id.
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of supplementary evidence to the defendant’s confession must be dealt
with more extensively.76 




What arises from everything we have said is that there is a compelling
need to alter the approach of the law to confessions made under
circumstances similar to those of the Duma case. Beyond this, as long as
we focus on the requirement of relevancy, the law requires us in any case 
to ignore a confession which has no probative value. At the same time, 
our research recognizes the fact that such disqualification and 
inadmissibility is impractical and may easily be misused by defendants 
and their counsel. Therefore, there is a need to balance the essential
requirements of the laws of evidence and law enforcement's need to fight
crime.
In order to strike a balance between these two aims, this Article
proposes to try, as much as possible, to isolate the element of the reliability 
of the confession by using the blue pencil doctrine,77 and to relate to it as
independent relevant evidence. Thus, for example, if the confession
includes hidden details from the scene, instead of disqualifying every jot 
and tittle of the confession (which would lead to the release of guilty 
parties and would harm the court’s attempt to uncover the truth),78 we
should disqualify it while leaving admissible the indicators of reliability
as independent circumstantial evidence.
76. We must note that Israeli databases do not show any example of a confession
disqualified due to a lack of something else. In light of the law of large numbers, assuming 
(optimistically) that about 0.1% of convictions are false, then at least one out of 1,000 false
confessions ought to be disqualified. This statement, on its own terms, raises many questions
about the aim of supplementary evidence and its proper status in these circumstances.
77. This means a relative disqualification of the confession, striking a balance between
admitting the confession (as in the Duma case) and totally disqualifying it as inadmissible, as 
arises from the Bayesian analysis. See supra Section III.A. See also Guy Seidman & Hillel
Sommer, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Disengagement Plan: In the Aftermath of the
H.C.J. Decision in the Regional Council of Gaza Beach v. the Israeli Knesset, 9 MISHPAT
UMIMSHAL 579, 603 (2006) [Hebrew] (discussing the blue pencil doctrine and its legal
ramifications, with an emphasis on using it in cases where it is difficult or close to impossible
to reach an unambiguous decision.
78. Concerning the dilemma between the ideal of exposing the truth and preventing the
conviction of innocents, see Doron Menashe, The Ideal of Finding Truth and the Principle of
Minimizing False Convictions: An Analysis of Complex Relations, 1 KIRYAT MISHPAT 307–34 
(2001) [Hebrew].
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The claim of this research is that the special legal protection of 
Section 12 does not extend beyond statements that are not an integral part
of the confession and which can rise to the surface even without it. In 
other words, the absence of this issue is not a lacuna, but rather a negative
arrangement, as even the Yissacharov case does not mandate the 
disqualification of the derivative evidence.79 
Indeed, it is correct that unlawful means motivated the suspect to
expose these details, but as long as these details are reliable, they should
not be automatically disqualified; rather, we must examine if it is possible 
to invalidate them according to a weaker general doctrine, which protects 
the suspect less, and rightfully so—in accordance with the ruling in the
Yissacharov case.80 
CONCLUSION
We have seen from a logical epistemic point of view that the law as
it stands, under the aegis of the Court, creates a situation in which there is
a substantive incentive to give a false confession. It would not be 
farfetched to claim that the law enforcement authorities—the recurring 
players in criminal proceedings—calculate their steps accordingly and 
consciously (at least potentially, if not practically), conforming to the 
incentives which exist to produce a false confession.
This situation brings us to the two conclusions we discussed above.
First, the confession of a defendant has no relevancy for the question of
his or her guilt, and this is based on the two-world model that originates
in Bayes’ Theorem. Therefore, we may disqualify the evidence based on 
Section 1 of the Israeli Evidence Law, which requires relevancy of the
evidence in order to present it.81 
Secondly, it is appropriate to establish a relative rule related to the 
admissibility of evidence regarding confession, in light of the difficulties 
inherent in the current situation. This is based on the understanding that 
it is not possible to disqualify evidence in a sweeping manner in light of 
the existing difficulties that law enforcement authorities have in fighting
crime, as well as the understanding that we cannot impinge in an essential
79. See CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor (May 4, 2006), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
80. Thus, there will be an important discussion regarding the tests set there, in terms of
the ease of acquiring evidence by lawful means—the alternative which the authorities had—and
all of the tests as required in the Yissacharov case.
81. See EVIDENCE ORDINANCE [NEW VERSION] ch. A, art. A, § 1 (1971) (Isr.).
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manner, as described, on the rights of the defendant. The blue pencil
doctrine would help us attempt to find a balance, in a measured way,
between these two important principles. It also would provide the court
with another tool to examine the issue, one that is not harsh and sweeping
like absolute disqualification. Adopting these principles, as presented
above, would allow more just and accurate verdicts, whether from the 
viewpoint of criminal procedural law and the appearance of justice, or
from the viewpoint of the essential law, as such false confessions are likely
to bring about false convictions.
